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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) which vests jurisdiction in this Court over "orders, judgments, and 
decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction." The Utah Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction over this matter and this Court has not transferred this matter to the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-4. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Was dismissal for failure to strictly comply with the notice provisions of 
the governmental immunity act proper? 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness in 
which the Supreme Court accords no deference to the District Court. This is a question 
of law and is reviewed for correctness in which the Supreme Court accords no deference 
to the District Court Dismissing an action, like Summary Judgment, is appropriate only 
when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "When reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment, as we do here, we review the district court's conclusions of 
law for correctness." See Taylor v. Ogden Sch. DisU 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996). 
Therefore the Court should grant no deference to the District Court's conclusion. Laney 
1 
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v. Fairview City. 2002 UT 79 (2002), 
Issue 2: Was the granting of the Dismissal appropriate when there is no analysis 
from the District Court. 
Standard of Review: The question of analysis is a question of law and is reviewed 
for correctness when there is an appropriate record. The Supreme Court accords no 
deference to the District Court. 
Issue 3: Whether the trial court violated it's own rules and Order by hearing the 
Motion to Dismiss within 30 days of the date of trial. 
Standard of Review: This is a mixed question of law and fact. Although the court 
reviews the underlying empirical facts under a deferential clear error standard, the legal 
effect of those facts "is the province of the appellate courts, and no deference need be 
given a trial court's resolution of such questions of law." State v. Vincent 883 P.2d 278 
(Utah 1994). 
Preservation for Appeal. All of the above issues were raised by 
Appellants/Plaintiffs before the Trial Court. A Notice of Appeal was timely filed. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The determinative Statute in this matter is Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11. The text 
of the Statute is attached in full in Addendum "A". i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: The Appellants seek review of the District Courts Findings of 
i 
2 
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Fact. Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss on August 8, 2002 in 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. District Court Case No.: 
980900223 WD. 
Course of Proceedings: Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on January 9, 1998 in the 
Third District Court seeking damages from the Defendants for wrongful death. (Rl at 1-
7). An Amended Complaint was filing on June 16, 1999 seeking the same relief. (Rl at 
26-30). Various discovery proceedings where conducted at the conclusion of which 
Plaintiffs filed a Certificate of Readiness for Trial and Request for Scheduling 
Conference. (Rl at 50-51). On June 2, 2000, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment alleging that defendants did not owe Plaintiffs a duty of care under the Public 
Duty Doctrine and that therefore Plaintiffs could not establish a prima facie case of 
negligence, that the negligence of Plaintiff s mother was greater than 50% and that the 
Governmental Immunity act bars recovery of damages negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. (Rl at 58-59). 
On August 28, 2000 the Trial Court entered an Order Granting Summary 
Judgment. (Rl at 222-224). The Order did not contain any Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law or analysis, but rather was based on the Court's minute entry that 
"Defendant Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for the reasons 
specified in the supporting memoranda." (Rlat218). 
Plaintiffs timely filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court (Rl at 225-
3 
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226). The Supreme Court on its own motion transferred the appeal to the Court of 
Appeals (R2 at 237). On September 27, 2001 the Utah Court of Appeals entered a 
Decision determining that the Motion for Summary Judgment was improvidently granted 
and that: 
because we cannot determine which of the several grounds advanced by the 
City in its Motion for Summary Judgment the trial court relied upon in 
makings its ruling, we reverse the trial court's decision and remand for 
proceedings consistent with our opinion. Gabriel v. Salt Lake City 
Corporation 234 P.3d 234 OJt 2001). 
The Order of Summary Judgment was reversed and the case was remanded and remitted 
to the Third District Court for further proceedings. (R2 at 239, see also Addendum "C"). 
On May 17, 2002, the Defendants submitted another Motion to Dismiss relying on 
the same basis as their prior Motion, but this time asking the Court to enter Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law based on their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Alternatively, the Defendants asked for an Order of Dismissal on the basis that Plaintiffs 
had failed to strictly comply with the mandates of the Notice of Claim provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, specifically that while Plaintiffs had served the Utah 
Attorney General and Salt Lake City Corporation, they had failed to serve a Notice of 
Claim upon both the Mayor and the City Council, as allegedly required by the Act. (R2. 
at 257-258). , ( 
On June 13, 2002, the Trial Court by Minute Entry denied Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the basis that "This Court questions the propriety of entering such 
4 
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findings on a summary judgment motion, particularly where the summary judgment has 
been reversed." The Alternative Motion to Dismiss on the basis of the alleged defect in 
service of the Notice of Claim was taken under advisement to "be ruled on at the time of 
trial." (R2 at 291). 
On June 21, 2002 Defendants filed a third Motion for Summary Judgment relying 
on the same grounds as its prior two Motions that had been denied or reversed by the 
Court of Appeals. (R2 at 307-308). Reply Memorandums were filed and on July 10, 
2002 the Defendants filed a Notice to Submit for Decision requesting expedited 
disposition as the matter had been set for bench trial on July 30-31. (R2 at 355-356). The 
Trial Court in Scheduling Order had directed that "Dispositive motions to be filed and 
heard no later than 30 days prior to trial." (R2 at 254-255). 
On July 16, 2002, a mere two weeks before trial, the District Court entered a 
Minute Entry holding that: "Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion to Dismiss 
on the basis of failure to comply with the Governmental Immunity act is granted for the 
reasons specified in the supporting memoranda." (R2 at 385). Over Plaintiffs objections, 
the Trial Court on August 8, 2002 entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss. (R2 at 400-403, see also Addendum B). 
A Notice of Appeal was timely filed by Plaintiffs on September 6, 2002. (R2 at 
404-405). 
Statement of Facts: The relevant facts in this matter are simple, straightforward 
5 
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and not disputed by the parties. A complete, detailed statement of the relevant facts is 
contained in the prior Utah Court of Appeals decision in this matter Gabriel v. Salt Lake 
City Corporation, 34 P.3d 234 (Utah 2001) (Rl at 241-247, See also Addendum "CT) For 
the sake of clarity, a brief summary of the facts follows: 
On April 20, 1996, Arek Tamassian was walking home. At approximately 1550 
West on North Temple, Ms. Tamassian crossed the street. There was not a painted 
crosswalk for over 700 feet in either direction from where Ms. Tamassian crossed the 
street; however, the particular area where she crossed had good lighting and visibility. 
As Ms. Tamassian was crossing the street, Steven Mayfield, an evidence technician for 
Defendants, was traveling westbound on North Temple on a non-emergency call. Mr. 
Mayfield struck Ms. Tamassian with his vehicle. The striking point was the left front 
portion of his vehicle. Ms. Tamassian then flew into the windshield and side of the 
vehicle. Ms. Tamassian was killed instantly. Only 5 months previous, Mr. Mayfield had 
struck another pedestrian under similar circumstances. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The sole basis for the Order of Dismissal is that Plaintiffs failed to strictly comply 
with the Notice of Claim requirements because they did not direct and deliver their 
Notice of Claim to the Mayor and the City Council as required by the Immunity Act. 
(Finding No. 4, R2 at 402). Appellant/Plaintiffs argue that any defect in service was 
insignificant in that notice was given to the proper parties and that no harm or prejudice 
6 
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was done by the failure to serve both the Mayor and the City Council. The Defendants 
failed to raise this alleged defect in their Answer and actually conceded that Notice was 
properly given. Further to the extent that Notice on both the Mayor and the City Council 
was required, it was accomplished by an Amended Notice of Claim. Finally, 
Appellants/Plaintiffs allege that the Order of Dismissal was improper in that it did not 
contain any analysis or reasoning and that the "dispositive motion" was filed and heard in 
violation of the Courts Scheduling Order. 
A R G U M E N T 
I 
PLAINTIFFS FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE 
PROVISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
At the time that Appellant/Plaintiffs first filed their Notice of Claim in January 
1997, the Governmental Immunity Act required that: "The notice of claim shall be ... (ii) 
directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity according to the 
requirements of § 63-30-12 or 63-30-13." Section 63-30-13 appears to apply as 
Defendant/Appellee Salt Lake City Corporation is a political subdivision. At the time of 
the Notice of Claim, Section 63-30-13 provided as follows: 
A claim against a political subdivision...is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year 
after the claim arises. 
The District Court found that Plaintiffs had failed to "strictly comply" with the 
7 
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notice of claim requirements because "... they did not direct and deliver their Notice of 
Claim to the mayor and City Council as required by the Immunity Act." (Finding of Fact 
No. 4, R2at 402). 
A. Defendants Waived any Defect in the Service of the Notice of Claim. 
Plaintiffs original Notice of Claim was dated January 16, 1997 and was directed 
and delivered to attorney General Jan Graham and to Salt Lake City Corporation. (R2 at 
266-267). Plaintiffs Complaint was filed on January 9, 1998 (Rl at 1-7) with an 
Amended Complaint filed on June 16, 1999. (Rl at 26-30). On July 8, 1999, Defendants 
filed their Answer to Amended Complaint. (Rl at 31-34). That Answer did not raise as a 
defense any defect in service or in the Notice of Claim. Indeed the Defendant's Answer 
actually conceded that Notice was properly given. Paragraph 8 of Defendant's Answer to 
Amended Complaint states as follows: "Defendant admits that a notice of claim was filed 
with Salt Lake City and that such claim is deemed denied as alleged in paragraph 8." (Rl 
at 32). 
It was not until almost three years latter on May 17, 2002, a little more than a 
month prior to trial that the Defendants for the first time claimed that the Notice of Claim 
must be served on the governing body of Salt Lake City and that governing body was the 
Mayor and the City Counsel. (R2 at 257-258). 
By failing to raise the defense of improper service in their Answer the Defendants 
waived that issue and were thus estopped and precluded from subsequently raising it 
8 
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virtually on the eve of trial. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h). Any language in the 
Courts order that said issue was jurisdictional and could be raised at any time, was 
incorrect and not previously raised by any of the parties. It was manifestly improper to 
raise the issue so late in the litigation. On this basis alone the Order of Dismissal should 
be reversed by this Court. 
B. Any Defect in Service of the Notice of Claim was "Cured" by the 
Amended Notice of Claim. 
Even if the original Notice of Claim was not fully and completely served on each 
and every possible party, any alleged defect has since been cured by the Amended Notice 
of Claim dated May 31, 2002 which was personally served on the Mayor's office as well 
as the City Council's office. (R2 at 277-282). When a Notice is amended, it "dates 
back" to the original notice date. 
The Defendants did not file any objection to the Amended Notice of Claim. 
Indeed their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (R2 at 283-287) does 
not even mention the Amended Notice of Claim. Any technical defect in the original 
Notice of Claim was completely and without objection cured by the Amended Notice. 
C Any Failure to Strictly Comply with the Notice Provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act were Insignificant and did not Harm or 
Prejudice any Party. 
No harm or prejudice was done to any party by any technical noncompliance with 
the Notice of Claim provisions. All the relevant responsible parties at Salt Lake City 
9 
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Corporation were notified of this claim. Indeed the claim was at all times defended by 
the Salt Lake City Attorneys. No allegation is made that the case would have been 
handled differently had the Mayor and City Council both been independently served with 
Notice of the Claim. Defendants are merely seeking to take advantage of a technicality 
which they discovered late in the litigation in an attempt to defeat the liability for their 
gross negligence which caused the death of Plaintiff s mother. 
The Governmental Immunity Act, when dealing with notice has been of 
considerable controversy. Indeed the cases Defendants cited in their Motion indicate by 
both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court that the law needed clarification. In 
fact, in 1998, the Utah Legislature amended the Immunity Act, clarifying exactly to 
whom Notices must be directed and delivered when prior to that it was vague and 
ambiguous. Specifically, in Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 37 P.3d 1156 (2001), the 
Court distinguished the modification of the Immunity Act as it pertains to the notice 
requirement by saying: 
Instead of using such general terms, the amended Immunity Act explicitly 
lists the individuals to whom the notice must be directed and delivered 
depending on the type of governmental entity involved. 
Currently, there is a committee of attorneys, judges and governing bodies that are 
looking into modifying the notice aspect of Immunity Act so that justice may prevail, that 
injured parties will have their due process and equal protection rights protected by being 
able to bring their grievances before the Court. Finally, it has been decided in Wheeler v. 
10 
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McPherson, 40 P.3d 632 (2002) that since the 1998 amendment to the notice portion of 
the Immunity Act that strict compliance to notice must occur. 
In Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah. App. 1994) the Court of Appeals 
determined that service upon the Attorney General and upon the State Division of Risk 
Management satisfied notice. Like this case, service of the notice was on the 
Municipality governing board and the Attorney General. Subsequent to said notice, 
discussions were held with Risk Management. An offer of settlement was even made by 
Salt Lake City Corporation. Defendants knew about the action and are not prejudiced by 
any alleged errors. 
D. Summary Judgment on this Issue was not Appropriate. 
Summary Judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, deposition, and affidavits 
show there is no genuine issue of fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. "Ordinarily, the question of negligence is a question of fact for the jury. 
Thus summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the most clear 
instances." Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990), see also King v. Searle Pharm. 
Inc., 832 P.2d 858 (Utah 1992). (noting the general judicial policy that favors a trial on 
the merits when there is some doubt as to the propriety of summary judgment). Summary 
judgment should be granted in negligence cases only in the "most clear instances". 
Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). 
In this case, the Court of Appeals specifically stated: "this court has explained that 
11 
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'negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from facts, which is properly 
done by juries rather than judges, 'summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases 
only in the clearest instances.''' Trujillo v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 1999 UT App 227, 986 
P.2d752. 
II 
THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL DID NOT CONTAIN ANY ANALYSIS UPON 
WHICH THIS COURT CAN REVIEW. 
This is the second Order of Dismissal the Trial Court has entered in this matter. 
The first Order of Summary Judgment was reversed and remanded by the Court of 
Appeals because it did not contain any analysis upon which the Court could determine 
the basis of the decision. 
This second Order of Dismissal shares the same defect. Although the Court 
signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, drafted by Defendant's counsel (R2 at 
400-403), those Findings do not contain any analysis, rather they are merely a 
restatement in Finding form of the summary allegations made by Defendants. There is 
no indication of analysis or the weighing of competing arguments. Like the first Order of 
Dismissal, there is simply no basis for this Court to analysis the basis for the Trial 
Court's decision. 
Furthermore the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Granting Motion to Dismiss, based on the defect in the original Notice of Claim, does not 
even mention or analyze the impact and significance of the Amended Notice of Claim. 
12 
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This rather signiFicant omission indicates that the Findings and Conclusions were totally 
inadequate. 
Ill 
THE GRANTING OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS NOT 
TIMELY AND IN VIOLATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
SCHEDULING ORDER. 
On May 14, 2002 the Court entered a Scheduling Order by way of minute entry. 
That Order directed that "Dispositive motions to be Filed and heard no later than 30 days 
prior to trial." Trial was scheduled for July 31, 2002. (R2 at 254-255) 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss raising the alleged defect in the service of the 
Notice of Claim was not Filed until May 17, 2002 and was not heard (Notice to Submit 
For Decision) until July 10, 2002 a mere 20 days prior to trial. Defendant's Motion was 
thus not heard "no later than 30 days prior to trial." and was improperly before the Court. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
PlaintifFs Complaint for wrongful death was improperly dismissed by the District 
Court for alleged failure to comply with the Notice of Claim service requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity act. Any defects in the original Notice was insigniFicant and 
technical only and did not prevent any party from timely receiving notice of the claim 
and being able to defend against it. In fact, the alleged defects in the Notice of Claim 
were not even raised until approximately three years into the litigation. Any defects in 
the Notice, however, were cured by an Amended Notice of Claim which was properly 
13 
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served on all parties. The District Court's Order of Dismissal lacks adequate fact finding 
and analysis and thus legally insufficient. Finally, the Motion to Dismiss was not filed 
and heard more than 30 days prior to trial and thus was improperly considered and ruled 
upon by the Court. 
Wherefore, Appellant/Plaintiffs pray that this Court reverse the Order of Dismissal 
and again remand the case to the District Court for trial. 
DATED this 4th day of April, 2003. 
DAyfEr^TpAR™ 
Glfio 
David W. Parker 
Counsel for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of April, 2003, a copy of the foregoing BRIEF 
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UT ST §63-30-11 
U.C.A. 1953 §63-30-11 
Page 1 
C 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Copyright ® 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
63-30-11 Claim for injury --Notice --Contents --Service --Legal disability 
--Appointment of guardian ad litem. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim 
were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of 
the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, 
parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an incorporated city or 
town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the claim is 
against a school district or board of education; 
(D) the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is against a special 
district; 
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(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of Utah; or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or executive 
secretary, when the claim is against any other public board, commission, or body. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent 
and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply 
to the court to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court may 
extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially 
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits. 
(d) (i) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim 
against a governmental entity is sustained by a potential claimant described in 
Subsection (4)(a), that government entity may file a request with the court for 
the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the potential claimant. 
(ii) If a guardian ad litem is appointed under this Subsection (4)(d), the time 
for filing a claim under Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 begins when the order 
appointing the guardian is issued. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch. 27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 
75, § 4; 1991, ch. 76, § 6; 1998, ch. 164, § 1; 2000, ch. 157, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted "the 
employee's" for "his" in Subsection (2); deleted "the responsible governmental 
entity according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30- 13" from 
Subsection (3)(b)(ii); added Subsections (3)(b)(ii)(A) to (3)(b)(ii)(F); and made 
stylistic changes throughout the section. 
The 2000 amendment, effective July 1, 2001, added Subsection (4)(d). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AUG - 8 2002 
SOUN1Y 
b'ipwy Ci*X~ 
FREDERICK GABRIEL and ELIZABETH 
ISAKJAN, as natural children and heirs of 
AREK TAHMASS1AN (deceased), 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
SALT LAKE CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, JOHN and JANE DOES 
I-X, and XYZ CORPORATIONS 1-X, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 980900223 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion to Dismiss came before this court for 
decision. The court, after taking the matter under advisement, hereby enters the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about January 16, 1997, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Claim. 
MOO 
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3. Strict compliance with the Immunity Act required that Plaintiffs' Notice be marked 
with the names of the Mayor and the City Council at the appropriate address, i.e. 451 
South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
4. Plaintiffs failed to strictjy comply with the notice of claim requirements because they 
did not direct and deliver their Notice of Claim to the Mayor and the City Council as 
required by the Immunity Act. 
5. Actual notice of a claim by a governmental entity does not relieve a party of his or 
her duty to strictly comply with the Immunity Act. 
6. Failure to strictly comply with the notice of claim requirements of the Lnmunity Act 
deprives the court of jurisdiction. 
7. This court lacks jurisdiction over all claims Plaintiffs have brought against the City. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and after reviewing the 
pleadings provided by both parties and the relevant case law, this court, for good cause 
shown thereon, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES 
1. Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion to Dismiss is granted on the grounds that 
Plaintiffs failed to strictjy comply with the notice of claim requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
2. All claims against Salt Lake City are dismissed with prejudice. 
MOV 
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DATED this T . d a y of i 
APPROVED AS TO FORM; 
Y THE THIRD DISTRIC COURT 
David W. Parker 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the (££%> day of July, 2002,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order first class postage prepaid, to: 
David W. Parker 
11075 South State, #13 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Frederick GABRIEL and Elizabeth Isakian, as 
natural children of Arek 
Tahmassian, deceased, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, Salt Lake 
City Police Department, John and Jane 
Does I-X, and XYZ Corporations I-X, Defendants 
and Appellees. 
No. 20000824-CA. 
Sept. 27,2001. 
Children of pedestrian, who was struck and killed 
by city employee while crossing street outside 
marked crosswalk, brought action against city, 
seeking damages for out-of-pocket medical, 
hospital, and funeral expenses, loss of inheritance, 
and mental anguish. The Third District, Salt Lake 
Department, J. Dennis Frederick, J., granted city's 
motion for summary judgment for the reasons set 
forth in city's memorandum. Children appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Thorne, J., held that trial court's 
decision failed to adhere to rule requiring a brief 
written statement of ground for decision, when a 
summary judgment motion was based on more than 
one ground. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error €=^934(1) 
30k934(l) Most Cited Cases 
[1] Appeal and Error €=^1073(1) 
30k 1073(1) Most Cited Cases 
Although failure to adhere to rule requiring a court 
to issue brief written statement of ground for its 
decision when a summary judgment motion is based 
on more than one ground does not, in and of itself, 
warrant reversal, the presumption of correctness 
ordinarily afforded trial court rulings has little 
operative effect when an appellate court cannot 
divine the trial court's reasoning because of the 
cryptic nature of its ruling. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
52(a). 
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[2] Judgment €==>187 
228k 187 Most Cited Cases 
Trial court failed to issue the required, brief written 
statement of the ground for grant of summary 
judgment to city on negligence claim asserted by 
pedestrian's survivors, given its failure to state 
whether it was relying upon the Governmental 
Immunity Act to dismiss entire claim, or whether it 
was relying on Act to dismiss only the attempt to 
recover damages for infliction of mental anguish. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-10; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a). 
[3] Judgment €==>186 
228k 186 Most Cited Cases 
[3] Judgment €=^187 
228k 187 Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's summary judgment decision was 
inadequate, given its failure to address to what 
extent, if any, it relied upon Comparative 
Negligence Act in dismissing negligence claim of 
pedestrian's survivors, what factual inferences, if 
any, it drew in reaching its decision, whether it 
impermissibly weighed evidence or assessed 
credibility, and why it invaded factfinder's province 
in apportioning fault or causation. U.C.A.1953, 
78-27-38; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a). 
[4] Judgment €^>187 
228kl87 Most Cited Cases 
Trial court failed to adhere to rule requiring a brief 
written statement of ground for decision, when a 
summary judgment motion was based on more than 
one ground, when it granted summary judgment to 
city on negligence claim asserted by pedestrian's 
survivors, but did not provide a statement regarding 
city's duty, or lack thereof, and did not indicate 
whether it relied on public duty doctrine in 
dismissing claim, especially in light of city 
employee's statutory duty to exercise care to avoid 
colliding with any pedestrian. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-80 
; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a). 
[5] Municipal Corporations €=>723 
268k723 Most Cited Cases 
Under the public duty doctrine, a special 
relationship can be established by a statute intended 
to protect a specific class of persons of which the 
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plaintiff is a member from a particular type of harm. 
*235 David W. Parker, Parker, Freestone & 
Angerhofer, PC, Sandy, for Appellants. 
Martha S. Stonebrook, Salt Lake City Law 
Department, Salt Lake City, for Appellees. 
Before Judges GREENWOOD, BENCH, and 
THORNE. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge: 
T[ 1 Plaintiffs Frederick Gabriel and Elizabeth 
Isakian (Appellants) appeal from an order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake City 
Corporation (City), dismissing their negligence 
claim. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
U 2 In the early morning hours of April 20, 1996, 
Steven Mayfield (Mayfield) struck and killed Arek 
Tahmassian, Appellants' mother, with the City 
vehicle he was driving as Tahmassian crossed North 
Temple in the vicinity of 1500 West in Salt Lake 
City. Tahmassian did not cross North Temple in a 
marked *236 crosswalk. The closest marked 
crosswalk to the proximity where Tahmassian 
crossed North Temple was approximately two 
blocks west at Redwood Road. [FN1] 
FN1. Some dispute exists between the 
parties regarding the circumstances 
surrounding the accident. Appellants 
claim that the point at which Tahmassian 
crossed North Temple was adequately lit; 
however, the City disputes Appellants' 
claim. Further, Appellants claim that 
Tahmassian had crossed three of North 
Temple's six traffic lanes before being 
struck. The City also disputes this claim. 
f 3 At the time of the accident, Mayfield, an 
evidence technician for the Salt Lake City Police 
Department (Department), was en route to a 
non-emergency call to investigate a crime scene. 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim 
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Mayfield was traveling westbound on North 
Temple. He indicated that he was driving at a 
speed of approximately 35 to 40 mph and that he 
had the vehicle's headlights on. He also indicated 
that he had the vehicle's heater on and was listening 
to a talk radio program. 
K 4 Following the accident, an investigation 
ensued, which included taking a statement from 
Mayfield, [FN2] performing brake tests on the 
vehicle, and drawing blood from Mayfield. The 
blood draw showed that Mayfield had neither drugs 
nor alcohol in his blood. The accident report 
concluded that at the time of the accident, it was 
still dark outside, there was little or no traffic on the 
road, and there was no rain or fog to impair 
Mayfield's vision. Ultimately, the Department 
neither reprimanded Mayfield nor cited him for a 
traffic violation as a result of the accident. 
FN2. In that statement, Mayfield estimated 
his speed at the time of the accident, 
indicated that the vehicle was in good 
working condition, and indicated he was 
not distracted by anything prior to the 
accident. 
1 5 On January 9, 1998, Appellants filed 
negligence claims against Mayfield, individually, 
and against the City. Later, Appellants amended 
their complaint, dropping Mayfield as a named 
defendant. In their complaint, Appellants asserted 
that Mayfield's "failure to pay attention to the road, 
objects and pedestrians" resulted in the accident. 
Appellants also asserted that "[defendants engaged 
in negligent infliction of emotional stress towards 
the plaintiffs." As a result, Appellants sought 
damages for out-of-pocket medical, hospital, and 
funeral expenses, as well as loss of inheritance. 
Appellants also sought damages for mental anguish. 
K 6 On June 2, 2000, the City moved for summary 
judgment asserting: (1) Appellants' negligence 
claim fails because the City did not owe 
Tahmassian a duty of care; (2) Tahmassian's own 
negligence exceeded fifty percent, and therefore, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38, the Comparative 
Negligence Act, barred Appellants' claim; and (3) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10, the Governmental 
Immunity Act, precluded Appellants from 
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recovering damages resulting from mental anguish. 
K 7 On August 28, 2000, the trial court granted the 
City's motion, stating simply that the City's motion 
was granted "for the reasons set forth in [the City's] 
memorandum supporting its motion." The trial 
court's order did not explain the basis for its 
conclusions, nor did the trial court explain its 
conclusions at a later time. This appeal followed. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
If 8 Although the parties argue the applicability of 
the public duty doctrine, the Governmental 
Immunity Act, and Utah's comparative negligence 
statute, the central issue before us is whether, in 
light of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), the trial 
court adequately supported its decision to grant the 
City's summary judgment motion, enabling us to 
review the trial court's decision properly. " 'We 
review the trial court's summary judgment ruling [ ] 
for correctness.' " Fire Ins. Exch. v. Therkelsen, 
2001 UT 48, H 11,27 P.3d 555 (citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
K 9 In granting the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the trial court stated that it granted the 
motion for the reasons set forth in the City's 
supporting memorandum. The trial court did not 
explain the basis for its decision. Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a) *237 states that the trial court 
"shall ... issue a brief written statement of the 
ground for its decision on all motions granted under 
Rule[ ] ... 56 ... when the motion is based on more 
than one ground." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
[1] U 10 Although failure to adhere to Rule 52 
does not, in and of itself, warrant reversal, see 
Retherford v. AT & T Communications, 844 P.2d 
949, 958 n. 4 (Utah 1992), "the presumption of 
correctness ordinarily afforded trial court rulings 
'has little operative effect when [we] cannot divine 
the trial court's reasoning because of the cryptic 
nature of its ruling.' " Id. (quoting Allen v. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 
800 (Utah 1992)). As is evident from our 
discussion below, we are unable to square the trial 
court's ruling with the various arguments asserted in 
the City's motion. Accordingly, we are left with 
little choice but to reverse and remand the trial 
court's decision. 
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A. The Governmental Immunity Act 
[2] f 11 The City argued that Appellants "are not 
entitled to recover damages for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress." Indeed, Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-10 (2000), the Governmental Immunity Act 
(the Act), expressly states that all governmental 
entities retain immunity from claims for "infliction 
of mental anguish." Id. § 63-30-10(2). However, 
"[i]mmunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent 
act... of an employee committed within the scope of 
employment." Id. § 63-30-10. 
% 12 Here, Appellants filed a negligence claim 
against the City, requesting a variety of damages 
that included damages for mental anguish. While 
the trial court may have relied upon subsection 2 of 
the Act to dismiss Appellants' attempt to recover 
damages for infliction of mental anguish, it could 
not have relied upon the Act to dismiss Appellants' 
entire negligence claim because under the Act 
immunity has been waived. See id. Because the 
trial court failed to "issue a brief written statement 
of the ground for its decision," we are unable to 
discern to what extent, if any, the trial court relied 
upon the Act in reaching its decision. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a). 
B. Comparative Negligence 
[3] If 13 In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
City argued that "Tahmassian's negligence was 
greater than 50%," and therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-38, the Comparative Negligence Act, 
precludes Appellants from recovering on their 
negligence claim. The Comparative Negligence 
Act, in pertinent part, states: "[a] person seeking 
recovery may recover from any defendant ... whose 
fault ... exceeds the fault of the person seeking 
recovery." Id. § 78-27-38(2). In Acculog, Inc. v. 
Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984), our supreme 
court addressed the issue of comparative 
negligence, explaining: 
From its inception comparative negligence law 
has been so construed that once the combined 
negligence of plaintiff and defendant in causing 
the injury to the plaintiff is established, it is 
within the province of the trier of fact to 
apportion fault or causation.... In other words, 
where plaintiffs negligent conduct was a 
contributing factor in causing the injury, 
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comparative negligence becomes a defense for 
the defendant. 
Id. at 730 (citation omitted). 
H 14 Further, with regard to negligence claims in 
general, this court has explained that " 'negligence 
cases often require the drawing of inferences from 
facts, which is properly done by juries rather than 
judges, "summary judgment is appropriate in 
negligence cases only in the clearest instances." ' " 
Trujillo v. Utah Dep't ofTransp., 1999 UT App 227, 
U 12, 986 P.2d 752 (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake 
City, 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1996) (citation 
omitted)). Moreover, "[t]rial courts must avoid 
weighing evidence and assessing credibility when 
ruling on motions for summary judgment." Id. at H 
42. 
11 15 Here, we are unable to glean from the trial 
court's ruling (1) to what extent, if any, the trial 
court relied upon the Comparative Negligence Act 
in reaching its decision; (2) what factual inferences, 
if any, the trial court drew in reaching its decision, 
see id. at H 11; and (3) whether the trial court 
impermissibly *238 weighed the evidence or 
assessed credibility. See id. at U 42. Finally, 
assuming the trial court relied upon the 
Comparative Negligence Act to reach its decision, 
we are left without explanation as to why the trial 
court invaded what is typically "the province of the 
trier of fact to apportion fault or causation." 
Acculog, 692 P.2d at 730. 
C. Public Duty Doctrine 
[4] 1f 16 The City argued that it owed Tahmassian 
no duty of care, and therefore, Appellants cannot 
make out a prima facie negligence claim. The City 
relies on the public duty doctrine to support its 
argument. In Day v. State, 1999 UT 46, 980 P.2d 
1171, our supreme court explained: 
The public duty doctrine provides that although a 
government entity owes a general duty to all 
members of the public, that duty does not impose 
a specific duty of care on the government with 
respect to individuals who may be harmed by 
government action or inaction, unless there is 
some specific connection between the 
government agency and the individuals that 
makes it reasonable to impose a duty. 
Id. atH12. 
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H 17 Further, the court explained: 
At least four circumstances may give rise to a 
special relationship between the government and 
specific individuals. A special relationship can 
be established (1) by a statute intended to protect 
a specific class of persons of which the plaintiff is 
a member from a particular type of harm; (2) 
when a government agent undertakes specific 
action to protect a person or property; (3) by 
government actions that reasonably induce 
detrimental reliance by a member of the public; 
and (4) under certain circumstances, when the 
agency has actual custody of the plaintiff or of a 
third person who causes harm to the plaintiff. 
Id. at K 13 (internal footnotes and citations 
omitted). 
11 18 As our supreme court stated in Lyon v. 
Burton, 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616, "[generally, it is 
appropriate to address liability issues, particularly 
the issue of whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a 
duty of due care, prior to addressing the affirmative 
defense of the defendant's immunity from suit." Id. 
at K 12 (discussing governmental entity's immunity 
from suit under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10, the 
Governmental Immunity Act). However, as we 
have previously discussed, the trial court has 
provided this court with neither a statement 
regarding the City's duty, or lack thereof, nor a 
statement indicating whether it did in fact rely on 
the public duty doctrine in dismissing Appellants' 
negligence claim. 
[5] K 19 Of particular significance, is the absence 
of any discussion by the trial court regarding the 
public duty doctrine in light of the fact that a special 
relationship can be established "by a statute 
intended to protect a specific class of persons of 
which the plaintiff is a member from a particular 
type of harm." Day, 1999 UT 46 at % 13. This is 
significant because Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-80 
(2000) states that "the operator of a vehicle shall 
exercise care to avoid colliding with any 
pedestrian." Id. [FN3] Whether or not this 
exception is applicable to the present matter, the 
trial court's failure to provide a specific basis for its 
decision precludes us from determining to what 
extent, if any, the trial court relied on the public 
duty doctrine in reaching its decision. 
FN3. See also Salt Lake County, Utah, 
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